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ABSTRACT 
In this age of asymmetric warfare, cyberspace provides new opportunities and 
vulnerabilities for achieving strategic effects. As a revisionist power, Russia has 
embraced cyberspace as a key tool and a force multiplier to achieve its geopolitical 
objectives and target perceived adversaries. Since the Russia-Georgia war in 2008, the 
Kremlin has continued a full spectrum of information warfare as a part of coercive 
attempts to alter Georgia’s pro-Western orientation and undermine its national security 
apparatus.
Based on the four distinct cases of cyber incidents from 2008 to 2020, this thesis 
explores Russia’s information warfare against Georgia and the role of the cyber 
component within it. The purpose of this thesis is twofold: First, it highlights the 
importance of understanding the Russia’s threat stemming from cyberspace, as it appears 
to be characterized by certain ambiguities. Second, as a result of examining the patterns 
of Russia’s hostile actions in this new domain, this thesis provides foundations for 
potential countermeasures by referring to existing best practices and experiences, which 
are built on the robust cybersecurity and cyberdefense strategy models developed by 
Israel and Estonia. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. CONTEXT ..................................................................................................1
B. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS ....................................3 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES .......................................................4 
UNDERSTANDING RUSSIA’S INFORMATION WARFARE ......................5 
A. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................5
B. RUSSIA’S VIEW OF THE INFORMATION SPACE ..........................5 
C. THE NEW-TYPE OF WARFARE AND INITIAL PERIOD OF
WAR ............................................................................................................9 
D. REFLEXIVE CONTROL .......................................................................11 
E. RUSSIA’S ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE .......................................13 
F. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................19 
GEORGIA’S RUSSIAN THREAT IN CYBERSPACE ...................................21 
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................21
B. SECURING CYBERSPACE IN GEORGIA.........................................21 
C. THE AUGUST WAR 2008 ......................................................................23 
D. GEORBOT CASE ....................................................................................26 
E. THE OCTOBER CASE ..........................................................................27 
F. THE LUGAR LAB CASE .......................................................................29 
G. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................32 
CYBERSECURITY AND CYBERDEFENSE IN ISRAEL AND 
ESTONIA..............................................................................................................35 
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................35
B. EVOLUTION OF MODERN ISRAELI CYBERSECURITY ............37 
C. CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY OF ISRAEL ...................................39 
D. THE IDF AND NATIONAL CYBERDEFENSE STRATEGY ...........41 
E. THE ESTONIAN CYBERSECURITY AND STRATEGY .................44 
F. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................48 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................49 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................55 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................63 
viii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ix 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
C4I Command, Control, Computers, Communication, and Intelligence 
CDU Cyber Defense Unit of Estonia 
CERT Georgian Computer Emergency Response Team 
CERT-IL Israeli Computer Emergency Response Team  
DCID Dyadic Cyber Incident and Dispute Dataset 
DDoS distributed denial of service  
ICS Industrial Control Systems 
ICT Information and Communications Technology 
IDF Israel Defense Forces 
INCB Israeli National Cyber Bureau 
INCD Israel National Cyber Directorate 
IRA Internet Research Agency (Kremlin) 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NCSA National Cyber Security Authority 
NIS New Israeli Shekel 
NISA Israeli National Information Security Agency 
R&D Research & Development 
SDR  State Security Service of Georgia  








Since declaring national independence in 1991, Georgia has been in asymmetrical 
power relationship with Russia.1 Russia has tried to exploit Georgia’s defense and security 
vulnerabilities from the very beginning of its independent statehood by fomenting regional 
conflicts, encouraging political extremism, and, as in 2008, even invading militarily.2 
Nonetheless, despite Russia’s occupation of a significant and strategically important part 
of Georgian territory, Georgia managed to build effective state institutions and democratic 
structures.3  
The focus of this thesis is how Russia employs cyber strategies against Georgia and 
what countermeasures Georgia can use to contain Russia’s encroachment on its 
sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity in terms of information warfare and, in 
particular, in the cyber security domain.  
Cyber strategies as a part of twenty-first century political warfare is an emerging 
pattern for the new technological era. In the last two decades, there have been four distinct 
cases of Russia’s use of information warfare and its cyber capabilities to disrupt Georgia’s 
information security systems. These happened during the Russian invasion of Georgia in 
August 2008; twice when Russia hacked Georgia’s government agencies in 2011 and 2019; 
and the latest—a combined cyber and disinformation campaign against Georgia’s critical 
infrastructure and medical facility in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis.  
These four cases were part of Russia’s relatively newly established arsenal of 
information warfare that has gained significance in Russia’s foreign and security policy in 
 
1 Georgia’s population is 3.7 mln while Russia’s population exceeds 142 mln. Militarily, the 
imbalance is even more striking, see “Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia,” The Military Balance 120, no.1 
(February 14, 2020).  
2 Stephen F. Jones, Georgia: A Political History since Independence (New York, NY: I.B. Tauris, 
2012). 
3 Stephen F. Jones and Neil S. MacFarlane, Georgia: From Autocracy to Democracy (Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press: 2020).  
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the last decade. For Russia, cyberspace has become integral to the information space and 
cyber activity has emerged as a subcategory of the information warfare. Given the decline 
in Russia’s defense resources in comparison with the times of USSR, and the asymmetry 
relative to the capabilities of the United States and its NATO allies, information warfare 
has become a relatively affordable option for waging political warfare abroad, especially 
in Russia’s so-called “near abroad,” which encompasses the countries that had been part of 
the former Soviet Union prior to 1991.  
Such operations have been deployed against Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine at 
different times in the last two decades. Russia’s activity in these countries displayed a 
discernable pattern, which presumes deployment of soft power means for winning the local 
populations’ sympathy, and, in case of failure of such, continues to coerce and intimidate 
the target audiences. Manipulation of target audiences’ perceptions has become the primary 
objective of Russia’s information operations, while the purpose of cyber activity has been 
short-term critical disruption of the target’s state institutions and/or support for Russia’s 
on-ground military operations.  
However, the record of Russia’s use of cyber strategies as a part of political warfare 
indicates that the Kremlin has not been very effective in relation to its purported political 
objectives and has failed when countered by the target states with appropriate political and 
technological tools in systematic and consistent ways. This record also shows that Russia’s 
cyber operations may not have succeeded even in conditions of significant power 
asymmetry in Russia’s favor. This is particularly evident when countermeasures are taken 
both in terms of international and informational domains, by aggregating political and 
technological tools against Russia’s activities.  
This thesis has both analytical and prescriptive purposes as it seeks to describe and 
analyze Russia’s approach to information warfare, discuss a case study of Russia’s cyber 
operations against Georgia, and, finally, identify potential countermeasures to Russian 
activities, as developed by other countries in similar or comparable circumstances.  
As historical tendencies demonstrate, Russia is likely to continue to pose an 
existential threat to Georgia’s national security. Therefore, the primary focus of this paper 
3 
is to analyze Russia’s cyber operations against Georgia as an integral part of Russia’s 
information warfare and seek successful models of countermeasures, as created by Israel 
and Estonia in particular.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS 
The more specific question this thesis seeks to answer is what the most appropriate 
defense and security systems may be for countering Russia’s information warfare and in 
conditions of power asymmetry.  
For answers, the thesis relies on deductive logic, inferring conclusions from 
Russia’s doctrinal and conceptual documents; analyzing the patterns of Russia’s 
historically documented activities in cyber domain; and by comparing the experiences of 
countries with similar international standing and adequate systems for coping with 
malicious cyber activities by asymmetrically superior powers. These comparative cases 
include successful cybersecurity models based on technologies, science, and cyberspace 
but also on political and diplomatic effectiveness. While answering the question, regional 
and infrastructural similarities as well as power asymmetry and some other factors, 
including international involvement will also be considered.  
The lead hypothesis for this paper is that a rigorous model of information warfare 
management can work even in a case of power asymmetry, when based on both 
technological as well as political efficacy, and long-term vision of cybersecurity and cyber 
defense strategy. Employing cyber capabilities to support national security is essential for 
the security strategy for Georgia and some other regional countries, and can be force 
multiplier, given the fact that Russian cyber operations are normally an accompanying 
element to more conventional operations rather than stand-alone attacks against the target 
countries. Strategic communications, as part of political measures, are also a crucial 
element in countering Russian information warfare.  
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C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis uses case study as a method for answering the research question and 
validating the hypothesis. The case is Russian aggression against Georgia, which includes 
the information warfare aspect. The thesis draws practical recommendations based on 
comparative study of information warfare systems in Georgia, Estonia, and Israel, all of 
which exist and operate in conditions of power asymmetry with regional powers.  
In the first chapter of the thesis, analysis of Russia’s doctrinal and conceptual 
documents is given, complemented with anecdotal historical experiences in Russia’s 
information warfare in the past two decades. This chapter aims at identifying patterns in 
Russia’s cyber activities, with potential implications for smaller neighboring countries, 
such as Georgia.  
The second chapter analyzes the historical record of Russia’s actions in Georgia in 
four distinct cases, ranging from the cyberattacks accompanying ground offensive in 2008 
to the 2020 disinformation campaign and cyberattack against the so-called Lugar Lab, 
established in close partnership with the United States Government.  
The third chapter analyzes the cybersecurity systems created by Israel and Estonia, 
two countries that are similar to Georgia in a sense that they cope with power asymmetries 
with neighbors and also face information warfare challenges from multiple sources, 
including state and private entities.  
The major method of researching the case study is deductive reasoning, which 
draws inferences from Russian doctrines and conceptual documents pertaining to 
information warfare. A comparative method is also used, which juxtaposes Georgian 
experiences with those of Israel and Estonia, inferring recommendations for Georgia’s 
future cybersecurity system from the analysis of Israeli and Estonian experiences.  
In the final, concluding part of the thesis, recommendations for Georgia’s 
information security are presented.  
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 UNDERSTANDING RUSSIA’S INFORMATION WARFARE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Kremlin has a long history of executing well-coordinated influence operations 
against its perceived adversaries in order to subvert and undermine them indirectly. With 
the advent of the information age, Moscow has realized new cyber domain opportunities 
and started to exploit this domain as a force multiplier for their political-military 
campaigns, thus, making specific operations more feasible and cost-effective as well. In 
other words, it has provided additional means for Russia to bolster its influence campaigns 
by employing a combination of cyber intrusions and propaganda. In retrospect, Russia’s 
activities primarily against its neighbors—Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine—demonstrated 
that it perceives cyberspace as an effective domain for employing their tactics successfully. 
Georgia was the first country that Russia targeted with a combination of kinetic and cyber 
means during the international conflict in 2008. Some of the similar cyber techniques 
Russia employed against Estonia in 2007, but tensions never escalated to a full-scale war. 
Since then, the Kremlin has only become more active in waging information warfare 
against its perceived adversaries while demonstrating interest in reclaiming its sphere  
of influence.  
This chapter reviews the literature on Russia’s information warfare and examines 
how cyberspace has been utilized by Russia within the broader information warfare 
concept. Also, it explores Russia’s perspective on cyberspace as a fifth domain of strategic 
confrontation. The purpose of this chapter is to extract and highlight the major aspects  
of Russia’s understanding of employing cyber ways and means based on existing studies 
and observations. 
B. RUSSIA’S VIEW OF THE INFORMATION SPACE 
Over the past decade, there has been a considerable amount of study and analysis 
with Russia’s “new” way of war. It can be said that in the twenty-first century, the Russian 
Federation has successfully revived the Soviet tactics of “active measures” using modern 
technology and information space. According to Shultz and Godson, active measures, 
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which is an analogue for Western political warfare, during the Cold War era was an 
important tool to support Soviet foreign objectives.4 Soviet diplomatic and intelligence 
services employed covert and overt techniques that included “setting up and funding front 
groups, covert broadcasting, media manipulation, disinformation and forgeries,  and 
buying agents of influence.”5 In this light, Russia has utilized the internet and social media 
networks to stage hostile information campaigns as well as cyber-maneuvers to expose 
societal vulnerabilities of its perceived adversarial states. According to Benjamin Jensen, 
Russia uses this method as a “covert psychological warfare … designed to undermine a 
rival population’s morale or faith in their political leaders.”6  
Many different scholars and pundits have discussed Russia’s information warfare 
in cyberspace in order to explain how and why it became one of the main instruments for 
Moscow. Before examining the Kremlin novelties from different perspectives, it is 
important to emphasize that the modern Russian doctrines and policy consider cyberspace 
as an integral part of the information space and view information and cyber operations as 
a unified concept. Terms like cyberspace (kiberprostranstvo) or cyber warfare (kibervoyna) 
are used only in translations of foreign texts.7 In other words, Russia sees cyber as a subset 
of information warfare and as an enabler for gaining superiority in the information 
landscape.8 This thought is conceptualized in the Russian military doctrine of 2014, which 
views information as a cornerstone for national security and as an additional instrument of 
power in combination with conventional and nonconventional ones. Moreover, 
 
4 Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy. 
Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Publishers. 1984, 2. 
5 Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb, “Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic 
Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference,” Strategic Perspectives, no. 
11(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2012), 8. 
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-11.pdf. 
6 Benjamin Jensen, “The Cyber Character of Political Warfare,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 24, 
no. 1(October 1, 2017): 166, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1quiULILaIvSSQsOzQed0D1lgu1i38mQs/
view. 
7 Scott Jasper and Keith Alexander, Russian Cyber Operations: Coding the Boundaries of Conflict 
(Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2020), 71. 
8 Michael Connell and Sarah Vogler, Russia’s Approach to Cyber Warfare (Arlington, VA: Center for 
Naval Analyses, 2017), 3, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DOP-2016-U-014231-1Rev.pdf.  
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information warfare is conceived as a means that could be employed both during both 
peacetime and wartime.9 Simply, it is a continuous malign action targeting the opponent. 
In order to discuss the Kremlin’s refined information warfare, it is important to 
have an understanding of the main concepts that underpin Russia’s holistic approach. 
Jolanta Darczewska from the Centre for Eastern Studies notes that Moscow’s information 
warfare has a long history and follows the same approach as the preceding Soviet period 
spetspropaganda (special propaganda), which under President Vladimir Putin has obtained 
additional value in a “battlefield” against the West and its “near abroad” countries.10 She 
also suggests that, 
most Russian authors understand ‘information warfare’ as influencing the 
consciousness of the masses and as part of the rivalry between the different 
civilizational systems adopted by different countries in the information 
space by use of special means to control information resources as 
information weapons.11 
Darczewska further describes the logic behind the Russian conduct of information 
warfare and argues that, 
The theory of information warfare is part of Russia’s strategic culture. It is 
characterised by, among other features: the ‘besieged fortress’ syndrome; 
the desire to guarantee their own security without respect for the security of 
other countries; the authoritarian regime’s fear of revolt; mythologising its 
own army and special forces; the desire to regulate all aspects of security, 
including the use of force beyond the letter of the law; imposing the 
principle of limited sovereignty upon its allies and neighbours; the 
militarisation of social and political life; and forcing an ideological image 
of the world upon other countries (now being presented as a confrontation 
between the ‘American world’ and the ‘Russian world.’12 
 
9 Ulrik Franke, War by Non-Military Means: Understanding Russian Information Warfare, FOI-R-
4065-SE (Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency, 2015), 14, http://dataspace.princeton.edu/jspui/
handle/88435/dsp019c67wq22q. 
10 Jolanta Darczewska, The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, a 
Case Study, no. 42 (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, 2014), 9, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
point-view/2014-05-22/anatomy-russian-information-warfare-crimean-operation-a-case-study. 
11 Jolanta Darczewska, The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare, 12. 
12 Jolanta Darczewska, The Devil is in the Details: Information Warfare in the Light of Russia’s 
Military Doctrine, no. 50 (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, 2015), 7–8, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/
191967/pw_50_ang_the-devil-is-in_net.pdf. 
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A Russian official document, the Conceptual Views on The Activity of The Armed 
Forces of The Russian Federation in Information Space, defines information war as, 
confrontation between two or more states in the information space with the 
purpose of inflicting a damage to information systems, processes and 
resources, critical and other structures, undermining the political, economic 
and social systems, a massive psychological manipulation of the population 
to destabilize the state and society, as well as coercion of the state to take 
decisions for the benefit of the opposing force.13 
“Informational confrontation,” or informatsionnoye protivoborstvo, is another 
Russian government term for conflict in the information sphere, which entails two forms 
of influence: information-technical and information-psychological.14 According to 
Timothy L. Thomas, today these two aspects are more integrated in Russian understanding 
of information warfare theory than ever before. He further explains how they work 
together, 
For example, an information-technical cyber-attack against another nation’s 
banking industry exposes or manipulates data about the banking industry 
that causes fear or even information-psychological panic in the general 
population. Or consider how the exposure of an information-technical 
achievement such as the Status-6 torpedo (now known as Poseidon), which 
can be nuclear armed, could have an enormous impact on the information-
psychological stability of a U.S. coastal region that could be a target of such 
a torpedo.15  
The technical-information part of the Russian information warfare consists of 
information computer, intelligence systems and electronic warfare equipment. The 
psychological information primarily includes propaganda, disinformation and deception 
(maskirovka). Ulrik Franke also emphasizes that Russian military theorists suggest a 
 
13 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Russian Federation Armed Forces’ Information 
Space Activities Concept (Moscow: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2011),   
https://eng.mil.ru/en/science/publications/more.htm?id=10845074@cmsArticle. 
14 Defense Intelligence Agency, Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power 
Aspirations, DIA-11-1704-161 (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017), 38, 
https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/
Russia%20Military%20Power%20Report%202017.pdf. 
15 Timothy Thomas, Russian Military Thought: Concepts and Elements, MP190451V1 (Bedford, MA: 
The MITRE Corporation, 2019), 8–14, https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-19-1004-
russian-military-thought-concepts-elements.pdf. 
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combination of employment of psychological attack and computer attack simultaneously 
during a confrontation.16 Keir Giles regarding Russian recent campaigns in the information 
domain suggests that,  
[Russian] information warfare can cover a vast range of different activities 
and processes seeking to steal, plant, interdict, manipulate, distort or destroy 
information. The channels and methods available for doing this cover an 
equally broad range, including computers, smartphones, real or invented 
news media, statements by leaders or celebrities, online troll campaigns, 
text messages, vox pops by concerned citizens, YouTube videos, or direct 
approaches to individual human targets.17 
The innovative aspect in Russian information warfare today is that Russia started 
to implement subversive actions in cyberspace in order to pursue the military strategy while 
staying below the threshold of armed escalation. This is because uncertain and ambiguous 
features of cyberspace allow Moscow to maintain plausible deniability. For instance, taking 
into consideration the problem of attribution of cyberattacks the Kremlin can target an 
adversary’s military and civilian information systems and critical infrastructure.18 
Moreover, cyberspace has enabled Russia to identify its targets, both efficiently and 
economically. 
C. THE NEW TYPE OF WARFARE AND INITIAL PERIOD OF WAR
The reinvented “dark art” of Russia is largely based on a military concept published
in 2013 by the Chief of the General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov; this concept was 
later dubbed the Gerasimov Doctrine or New Generation Warfare (New-Type of War). The 
new-type warfare concept is a set of ideas about the changing character of war that has 
been adopted by the Russian strategic community. Dimitry Adamsky notes that it is “an 
amalgamation of hard and soft power across various domains, through skillful application 
16 Ulrik Franke, War by Non-Military Means, 23. 
17 Keir Giles, Handbook of Russian Information Warfare (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2016), 4, 
https://bdex.eb.mil.br/jspui/bitstream/123456789/4262/
1/2016_Handbook%2C%20Russian%20Information%20Warfare.pdf. 
18 Kevin N. McCauley, Russian Influence Campaigns Against the West: From the Cold War to Putin 
(North Charleston, SC: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016), 347. 
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of coordinated military, diplomatic, and economic tools.”19 Robinson et al. argue that it is 
a Russian response to the West: “description of how warfare has evolved in general, 
implying an intent both to understand the threat to Russia and also to adapt and utilize the 
Russian state to achieve its political objectives in the future.”20 According to Gerasimov, 
there is a need to create a holistic theory of asymmetric operations. He discussed a new 
approach of employing information warfare in combination with other means. According 
to this concept, two innovations have been observed: The first is that the ratio of non-
military and military measures is 4 to 1.21 The second, the informational domain is 
considered to be added to the space-aerial, naval, and ground ones. Gerasimov argued that 
in contemporary military operations at strategic, operational, and tactical levels are being 
less differed. Furthermore, he emphasized that in modern days, wars are no longer declared, 
and the critical component is the role of non-military tools and their utilization during the 
initial period of the operation (war), which itself is a critical phase and has a direct impact 
on the outcome of the whole campaign. For this reason, Russia’s main tactical objective is 
to maintain the information and situational superiority and rely on it.  
In 2016, the Russian Ministry of Defense, which is mostly responsible for 
performing cyber-attacks, propaganda-oriented actions and inserting malware in the 
command and control systems of opponents, established “information operations 
troops.”22 Since then, observed military exercises have involved “psychological warfare 
and information confrontation subunits,” which also reflect a shift in Russian thinking 
about the potential power of information warfare, which “goes to the heart of how wars are 
 
19 Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, “Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy,” 
Proliferation Papers 54 (Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, November 2015), 23, 
https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp54adamsky.pdf. 
20 Linda Robinson, Todd C. Helmus, Raphael S. Cohen, Alireza Nader, Andrew Radin, Madeline 
Magnuson and Katya Migacheva, Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses, 
RR-1772-A (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1772.html. 
21 Adamsky, “Cross-Domain Coercion,” 24. 
22 Keir Giles, The Next Phase of Russian Information Warfare (Riga: NATO StratCom COE, 2016), 
4, https://www.stratcomcoe.org/next-phase-russian-information-warfare-keir-giles. 
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won—whether by destroying the enemy or by rendering the enemy unable to fight.”23  
According to Stephen Blank, who is an expert on Russia and the former Soviet Union, 
“Russia has integrated cyber and information warfare organically into its planning and 
capabilities to project power.”24 
D. REFLEXIVE CONTROL 
Russia’s contemporary “informational confrontation” against its perceived 
adversaries is based upon Soviet era methods and is a core of psychological warfare. 
Hence, exploring the theory of reflexive control can facilitate in further analysis of the 
Russian perspective on information warfare. The concept of reflexive control originated in 
the Soviet Union in the 1960s and has been more or less continuously developed ever since. 
According to one study, “the ultimate goal of reflexive control is that the object of control 
will not be aware of the manipulation.”25 Hence, methods of reflexive control are similar 
to the deception concept and also include spreading false information to influence the 
decision-making process. Reflexive control can be defined as “a means of conveying to a 
partner or an adversary specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make 
the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action.”26 It should be noted that 
Thomas sees this concept as a subset of information warfare and suggests that Russia used 
it extensively in Ukraine when it employed influence operations in information space.27 
 
23 Keir Giles, Assessing Russia’s Reorganized and Rearmed Military, Task Force on U.S. Policy 
Toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
2017), 9, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/5.4.2017_Keir_Giles_RussiaMilitary.pdf. 
24 Stephen Blank, “Cyber War and Information War à La Russe,” in Understanding Cyber Conflict: 
14 Analogies, ed. George Perkovich and Ariel E. Levite (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2017), 81, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/
GUP_Perkovich_Levite_UnderstandingCyberConflict_FullText.pdf. 
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Thomas also argues that even an e-mail phishing attempt might be considered as an 
operation that entails reflexive control elements, because it aims to influence a target’s 
action, which will allow a virus to penetrate into the system.28 Valeriano, Jensen, and 
Maness emphasize that especially, Russia’s multimedia propaganda efforts are designed 
according to the abovementioned concept.29 
As reflected during the crisis in Ukraine, in order to avoid attribution, the military 
operations were highly deceptive. They were characterized by mixed coercive and 
subversive elements and included both military and non-military components in order to 
create confusion and influence effective decision-making. Rod Thornton further suggests 
that the Russian “new approach” was designed to generate defeatism—the adversary is 
passively persuaded to accept Russian occupation or they becomes convinced that 
confrontation will lead to destruction.30 Hence, the idea is to win “hearts and minds” first 
and, if that is not possible, then pursue tactics of coercion and intimidation. The Ukraine 
conflict is a vivid example of how Russia sees cyber activity as a subcategory and enabler 
of information warfare.31 The cyber features enable information operations for reflexive 
control because the target audience does not apprehend that its manipulation process is 
ongoing. Moreover, cyberspace provides more probability to mask the identity and source 
of the attack and also, maintain plausible deniability.  
Posard, Marrone, and Helmus from RAND Corporation argue that the reflexive 
control theory “assumes that people live in a polarized world of cooperation versus 
conflict.”32 They further note that, “the end goal for these efforts is to trigger emotional 
reactions and drive people to ideological extremes, making it nearly impossible to build a 
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consensus. The Russians also hope those who are not driven to extreme positions will throw 
up their hands in frustration and check out. The result is political paralysis.”33 
E. RUSSIA’S ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE 
Emerging cyber capabilities create new opportunities and challenges for the various 
actors in the world to engage in a new type of interaction for social and political reasons. 
Ryan Maness and Brandon Valeriano support the claim that cyber is a tactic and one of the 
instruments of a threat in diplomacy and international relations available at states’ 
disposal.34 Also, Jensen et al. note that cyber operations “represent a weak form of coercive 
diplomacy” and “digital intrusions are meant to be used with other sticks and carrots to 
shape an adversary’s decision-making.”35 
Dyadic Cyber Incident and Dispute Dataset (DCID), Version 1.1, which covers 
publicly attributed cyber incidents between states from 2000 and 2014, examined and 
analyzed 45 instances of Russian engagement.36 Valeriano et al. contend that “more often 
than not, Russia fails, doubles down, and fails again.”37 Data on cyber coercive exchanges 
between Russia and its rivals suggest that short-term disruptions and espionage activities 
were the most prevalent options. In general, Russian cyber actions include the 
amplification of state propaganda through different online media; also, using cyber 
disruptions, espionage, and degradation. 
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Valeriano et al. view cyber disruptions as a modern means for sending signals to 
rival states regarding its capabilities and intentions.38 Benjamin Jensen et al. define cyber 
disruptions as “a low-cost, low-payoff form of cyber strategy designed to shape the larger 
bargaining context … pressure a rival, through either signaling the risk of crisis escalation 
or, in combination with propaganda efforts, undermining public confidence in existing 
policy preferences.”39 
Russia predominantly employs distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks and 
web defacements against adversarial states. As Valeriano et al. argue, “Russia employs 
cyber disruption as a low-cost form of signaling escalation risks when they have a limited 
ability to achieve concessions through conventional means.”40 This way Moscow seeks to 
demonstrate the ability to inflict damage of the target’s network. The first precedent 
occurred when the websites of the Estonian government were targeted by DDoS attacks 
and were defaced but had a limited coercive impact. 
The Russian cyber espionage is more complex than short term cyber disruption. 
Cyber espionage is planned to “steal critical information or manipulate information 
asymmetries in a manner that produces bargaining benefits between rival states engaged in 
long-term competition.”41 It is perceived as a potential tool and an enabler for a long-term 
influence operation. 
Furthermore, Jensen et al. draw attention to two aspects. First, cyber espionage, in 
the event of network penetration, has a potential to prepare the ground for future operations. 
As explained, “not only do you access critical networks and steal information altering the 
balance of information in a crisis, but even if the intrusion is revealed, the target is left 
wondering what else was stolen and what other networks are compromised.”42 Second, 
cyber espionage can be a low-cost tool for manipulation of a target audience’s perceptions. 
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However, as examined by Valeriano et al., cyber degradation, which is a costlier signaling 
option than cyber disruption or espionage, “is more likely to have a compellent effect than 
disruptions or espionage.”43  
On February 26, 2015, the U.S. director of National Intelligence Gen. James 
Clapper stated that Russia was ready to conduct offensive cyber operations with 
engagement of newly established cyber command.44 He further emphasized, 
Computer security studies assert that unspecified Russian cyber actors are 
developing means to access industrial control systems (ICS) remotely. 
These systems manage critical infrastructures such as electric power grids, 
urban mass transit systems, air traffic control, and oil and gas distribution 
networks. These unspecified Russian actors have successfully compromised 
the product supply chains of three ICS vendors so that customers download 
exploitative malware directly from the vendors’ websites along with routine 
software updates, according to private sector cybersecurity experts.45 
On December 23, 2015, more than 230,000 people in the region of Ivano-
Frankivsk, Ukraine lost electricity for 6 hours as result of the cyber-attack. The perpetrators 
also carried out a coordinated telephone DDoS attack against the company itself, thus, 
crashing communication with the customers. However, it should be mentioned that clear 
attribution of the attack to the Russian Federation has not been committed. 
The Kremlin uses cyber means for waging a modern form of political warfare. As 
mentioned earlier, Russia’s actions in cyberspace have a similar patterns both in peacetime 
and in wartime—Russia uses low-cost, unsophisticated cyber techniques to disseminate 
malign propaganda and sows discontent within the targeted country, “while signaling the 
risk of escalation.”46 Moreover, despite having moderate cyber power, Russia is one of the 
most determined and active players in terms of conducting offensive operations in 
cyberspace.47 This is due to the modern information ecosystem, which is characterized by 
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non-existing entry barriers that have given Moscow the opportunity to design less 
sophisticated and low-cost operations “to shape public opinion and signal resolve.”48 
However, it should be noted that  Russia rarely employs sophisticated cyber methods and 
preferred to strike on non-governmental and non-military institutions. Also, Russia’s 
coercive actions have never caused any escalation beside diplomatic and economic 
sanctions, which actually coincided with the use of military power from Russia’s side as 
well. 
There is another aspect of Russia’s hostile campaign in cyberspace, which should 
be emphasized, and which makes Russia exclusively notorious—the Kremlin and cyber 
proxies. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the grave economic situation caused by mass 
unemployment and the unstable political environment turned many computer-savvy 
citizens into criminal-minded hackers. Russia as a rogue actor has established relationships 
with cyber-criminal organizations and individuals who can act as proxies and conduct 
various types of cyber operations against other states without leaving conspicuous traces.49  
Russia utilizes formal and informal resources to implement its malign influence 
campaigns. Russian Special Forces, Federal Security Service, and Main Directorate of the 
General Staff of the Armed Forces often are engaged in the aforementioned activities as 
well. The Russian law enforcement agencies indirectly sanction cyber-criminals to target 
third parties outside Russian territory. They do not respond to international requests to 
cooperate in investigation processes where Russian citizens are allegedly in connection 
with the crime. Moreover, they monitor cyber-criminals and enter into a proxy relationship 
that allows the latter to avoid arrest and stay under state “protection.” In return, the system 
gets individuals who in particular circumstances serve the Kremlin’s interests. 
There are four distinct patterns of relationship between the Russian state and cyber 
proxies. 
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1. Sanctioning in peacetime. The 2007 DDoS attack on Estonia was the first 
example of a peacetime period attack by the Kremlin-affiliated group, 
which conducted a sophisticated attack on Estonian government and 
business websites. 
2. Sanctioning in wartime. Since the start of hostilities in Ukraine, 
offensive cyber operations have been conducted concurrently against 
Ukrainian private and state organizations, that entailed attacks on critical 
infrastructure and governmental agencies. Alongside the Russian 
government, CyberBerkut and other pro-Russian actors that have carried 
out several cyber operations.  
3. Blitz orchestration. According to the various studies, in the Russo-
Georgian war of 2008, close cooperation was observed between Russian 
military and civilian cyber attackers because the timing of the cyber 
operation coincided with military maneuvers.  
4. Sanctioning and mobilizing. FSB representatives organized a criminal 
group to hack Yahoo network and gain access to sensitive information. 
Moreover, the Russian government did not comply with Interpol and 
ignored the Red Notice on one of the members of the group.50 
Apart from Russian governmental agencies, Russian state-sponsored media is also 
engaged in disinformation and influence campaigns. For instance, falsified information is 
disseminated to mislead target audiences by presenting them biased information that serves 
Russian foreign policy goals. For instance, one of the state-sponsored media outlets, Russia 
Today, rebranded later as RT, was founded in December 2005 for the purpose of promoting 
a positive image of Russia abroad. Today it reaches “over 644 million people in more than 
100 countries and available in more than 2.7 million hotel rooms.”51 As Lithuanian 
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Minister for Foreign Affairs Linas Linkevicus noted, “Russia Today’s propaganda machine 
is no less destructive than the military machine in Crimea.”52  
“Informational Confrontation” is based upon psychological warfare and is one of 
the main aspects of the Russian approach. In general, the informational-psychological 
influence represents the initial phase of the conflicts inspired by Russia, consisting of non-
conventional operations aimed at manipulating the public opinion inside the target country, 
as well as through the international media. In order to change or manipulate information, 
Russia widely uses a group of controlled internet users who have been identified to attack 
social media posts and news pieces countering the pro-Russian narrative. In fact, it is a paid 
commentator army of so-called trolls, which is the innovative instrument at Putin’s 
disposal.53 The largest grouping of hired trolls is the infamous the Internet Research 
Agency (IRA), which is funded by the Kremlin. According to Robinson et. al. “these 
groups regularly post information to websites in Russia and abroad to reflect the regime’s 
point of view, cast doubt on Western narratives, or otherwise influence public opinion.”54 
The task of the organization is to combat “Western influence” and media sources that have 
a negative stance towards Russia. Additionally, the function of some of these trolls is also 
to spread false content. One of the means of manipulation for Russia is the numerous 
internet bots controlled by the Kremlin, which essentially applications that automatically 
spread content throughout social media.55  
Putin sees the information space as a lever for advancing his core interests, whereas 
cyber capabilities are additional enablers to it. Informational dominance is pivotal for the 
Kremlin. Moreover, patterns of an evolving media environment and the modern 
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information ecosystem have bolstered Russia’s perspective in achieving its strategic goals 
by utilizing cyber-enabled information operations as well. According to Scott Jasper, these 
capabilities give Moscow a covert means to achieve its objectives and at the same time 
maintain plausible deniability.56 Moreover, Janis Berzins from Latvian National Defense 
Academy notes that  some of Russia’s new guidelines for building military capabilities in 
the nearest future envisages a focus more on direct influence rather than on direct 
destruction and champion contactless war instead of direct clash.57  
F. CONCLUSION 
Within the last 20 years, the Kremlin had an attempt to use technology and the 
internet in pursuit of its broader political goals. This was motivated by the belief that 
character of war has changed and with the advent of the information revolution the future 
battlefield would require totally new approaches. As a result, the Kremlin decided to focus 
on outweighing its own shortcomings and disadvantages through digitalized subversive 
and covert actions. This Russian political warfare tactics has a focus on division and 
deception of the enemy that is similar to the old Soviet methods. However, modern 
technologies allowed Russia to refine its signature moves and adjust them to adjust 
contemporary environment. Russia has excelled in framing discussions in a way that serves 
Russian interests. This becomes extremely dangerous in times of crisis, because Moscow 
can dominate and transmit another reality. Having this in mind, Russia most likely will 
continue to develop and expand its information tools of influence with the same success. 
However, the empirical analysis based on the most well-known cases suggest that the 
Kremlin has not received any significant gains as a result of its hostile cyber actions so 
far.58 Russia’s cyber coercion efforts have not been effective and signaling escalation risks 
have not been communicated successfully. 
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Russia’s cyber strategy resemble concepts of active measures and reflexive control 
from the Soviet period that entailed deception, information manipulation and 
disinformation as integral parts of the state policy. These days, one of the main objectives 
for Moscow is to utilize the information domain to its maximum extent and shape the target 
population’s opinion both within Russia and beyond its borders as well.  
Undoubtedly, Georgia is not and will not be an exception in the near future. The 
Kremlin will continue to undermine Georgia’s development and democratization process 
by attempts to sow chaos and facilitate destabilization. Georgia’s official document, 
Strategic Defense Review 2017–2020 emphasizes that Russia seeks “to limit international 
political support for Georgia and weaken cooperation directed at strengthening of defense 
capabilities.”59 Presumably, Moscow will predominantly rely on the elements of its soft 
power “to ensure the weakening of state institutions, strengthening of pro-Russian civil and 
political movements and discredit pro-Western foreign policy agenda.”60 
It appears that information warfare has become the modus operandi of Putin’s 
regime.61 The next chapter will discuss the major cyber incidents that targeted Georgia and 
has been attributed to the Russian Federation.  
 
59 Ministry of Defense, Strategic Defense Review 2017–2020 (Tbilisi, Georgia: Ministry of Defense, 
2017), 54, https://mod.gov.ge/en/page/73/strategic-defence-review. 
60 Ministry of Defense, Strategic Defense Review 2017–2020, 54. 
61 Deborah Yarsike Ball, Protecting Falsehoods with a Bodyguard of Lies: Putin’s Use of Information 
Warfare, No.136 (Rome: Research Division-NATO Defense College, 2017), 2, https://www.ndc.nato.int/
news/news.php?icode=1017. 
21 
 GEORGIA’S RUSSIAN THREAT IN CYBERSPACE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
After the end of the August War 2008, it soon became clear that Moscow would 
use all types of instruments in the future to continue pressuring pro-Western Georgia in 
order to coerce and convince Tbilisi to accept the so-called “new geopolitical reality”—the 
loss of its two historic regions of Abkhazia and  Tshkhinvali (“South Ossetia”).62 One of 
the main objectives of invasion was to cement Russia’s military presence in the country 
and thereby hinder Georgia’s Western orientation. Since then, Russia has become more 
aggressive and has stressed its interest in reclaiming the sphere of influence over the so-
called “near abroad.” Moscow has utilized cyberspace to conduct cyberattacks and 
information operations to expose Georgia’s vulnerability and upset the country’s national 
security frameworks. In response to these subversions, Tbilisi continues to develop and 
strives to join European Union and NATO. For this reason, Russia sees Georgia’s pro-
Western policy as a threat and the country itself as one of the battlegrounds in its 
confrontation with the West.  
This chapter will demonstrate the threats that Georgia faces from Russia in the 
cyber domain by looking at various Georgian official documents pertaining to its cyber 
posture and four cyberattacks on the state from 2008 to 2020, which have been attributed 
to the Russian Federation. 
B. SECURING CYBERSPACE IN GEORGIA 
For Georgia, as an object of Russia’s constant targeting, securing and defending its 
cyberspace is a national security priority. According to the annual report of 2018 of the 
State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG),  
it has been established that foreign countries and their special services have 
been using cyber capabilities more and more actively, in their own interests. 
Conducting cyberattacks and cyber intelligence operations against 
government and critical infrastructure objects by special services of foreign 
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countries and hacker groups controlled by them also represent a major risk 
to the security of the country.63 
Georgia has acknowledged the cyberthreats and has sought to address them in its 
policy documents. According to the National Security Concept of Georgia, strengthening 
the security of the cyberspace and ensuring safety of electronic information is one of the 
main interests for Georgia. Moreover, lessons from the cyberattacks during the 2008 
Russian-Georgian war and the subsequent evolving cyber threats have invigorated 
cybersecurity policy of Georgia.  
Today, threats stemming from the Russian Federation remain among the top 
security challenges for Georgia, according to Georgia’s Strategic Defense Review (SDR) 
of 2017–2020, which was published in April 2017. The SDR describes the future priorities 
of the Ministry of Defense and the Georgian Armed Forces, and also outlines the new 
structure that the armed forces hope to achieve by 2020. According to the SDR, Russia has 
an aggressive foreign policy, which is “a special threat for Georgia’s security 
environment.”64 The authors of the SDR also note that Russia seeks to strengthen its 
satellite groups, weaken state institutions and discredit Georgia’s pro-Western foreign 
policy.  
It should be noted that, these undermining activities are in line with the Russia’s 
perception on soft power, which is the integral part of Russia’s “new way of war.” For 
instance, Vladimir Putin in 2012 stated that soft power is “a matrix of tools and methods 
to reach foreign policy goals without the use of arms but exerting information and other 
levers of influence.”65 However, it diametrically differs from the Western 
conceptualization. Alexander Dolinsky makes an interesting observation and argues that 
 
63 State Security Service of Georgia, The Report of the State Security Service of Georgia, (Tbilisi: 
State Security Service of Georgia, 2019), 11, https://ssg.gov.ge/
uploads/%E1%83%90%E1%83%9C%E1%83%92%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%98%E1%83%A
8%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%98/SSSG%20Report%202018.pdf. 
64 Government of Georgia, Strategic Defense Review 2017–2020, 48. 
65 Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss, How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and 
Money (New York, NY: The Institute of Modern Russia, 2014), 12, https://imrussia.org/media/pdf/
Research/Michael_Weiss_and_Peter_Pomerantsev__The_Menace_of_Unreality.pdf. 
23 
“if the Western vision is based on building attractiveness, the Kremlin believes soft power 
to be a set of tools for manipulation.”66  
Prior to the SDR, the government of Georgia published its second cybersecurity 
strategy for the period 2017 to 2018.67 The strategy identified the Russian Federation as a 
key threat to Georgia’s critical infrastructure for the following reasons: the Russian 
Federation has not changed its aggressive cyber-policies, the Russian Federation has 
significantly enhanced its capabilities in the area of cyberattacks, and finally, the Russian 
Federation has significantly improved technical cyber applications in the areas of 
psychological influence. Since 2008, the dependence of Georgia on informational and 
communication technologies has significantly increased its exposure to cyberattacks. With 
this in mind and with cyberattacks on the rise, the threat landscape is constantly evolving. 
Indeed, these massive cyberattacks against Georgia, which are discussed below, are 
unsettling and highlight Georgia’s deep security vulnerabilities.  
C. THE AUGUST WAR 2008 
The Russian-Georgia war of 2008 was the first time that Russia used combination 
of coordinated cyber and information operations in support of its military campaign.68 It 
was conducted by the so-called patriotic hackers and resembled the same method that 
Russia used in Estonia in 2007, when numerous financial and governmental institution 
networks became victims of cyberattacks. In particular, webpages became defaced and 
targeted by distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks and website defacements.69 The 
computer network operations have several objectives that entail the disruption, degradation 
or collection of information from the enemy. However, in the 2008 war, Russia pioneered 
in the utilization of cyberspace in order to create informational and psychological 
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superiority for shaping the favorable narrative during the initial period of war. Moreover, 
Russia engaged cyber proxies in the conflict, which “ranged from the citizen hackers who 
perpetrated the attacks to the private companies who were relied on to defend against 
them.”70 This could be conceived as a part of a very organic relationships between 
criminals and government agencies that have emerged in post-Soviet Russia. Also, for 
several experts, such ties provide additional grounds to argue that the offensive cyber 
operations against Georgia were carried out by Russian criminals but orchestrated by the 
Russian government.71 
Reports suggest that about two weeks prior to the active phase of the conflict, 
Georgian government webpages were already targeted by malicious activities.72 The initial 
cyberattack at the end of July did not caused significant damage and served as a 
reconnaissance for the major attacks. However, as the Russian military advanced into 
Georgian territory, the cyberattacks intensified and became more sophisticated. The most 
active period was synchronized with the Russian major military offensive of Georgia from 
August 7 to 12. At the same time, it coincided with “rapid mobilization of non-state actors 
to project coercive (cyber) power, in the form of a DDoS attack.”73 Most analysts agree 
that command-and-control servers for these operation were located in Russia and the DDoS 
attack was coordinated through Russian hacker forums. Instructions for the attack were 
posted on different Russian sites so that every random visitor could have participated. As 
a result, a series of coordinated cyberattacks were carried out on the web pages of the 
Ministries of Internal and Foreign Affairs of Georgia, media outlets and National Bank. 
These DDoS attacks on average lasted approximately two hours and fifteen minutes, and 
the longest lasted six hours.74 Some even argue that despite the fact that “internet 
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penetration in Georgia was low, and the area of conflict was not fully plugged in to the 
global information environment,” the cyber component “played a significant, if not 
decisive role in the conflict—as an object of contestation and as a vector for generating 
strategic effects and outcomes.”75 However, it is less likely that DDoS attacks and web 
defacements could have affected military decision making and Georgian conventional 
force capabilities.76 What Russia really achieved was the psychological impact, that it was 
able to hinder central government of Georgia to interact with its own population. 
It is noteworthy that the August War in 2008 served as a harbinger for future 
contingencies, which should have been a wakeup call for the West. However, as the 
Ukrainian crisis showed, still there was a huge surprise component in Russia’s tactics. The 
Russia’s military campaign in Georgia demonstrated that a similar type of cyberattack and 
information campaign had the potential to develop further and also, to bring more severe 
consequences for a target country, that is more dependent on modern information 
technologies. As noted by Ronald Heickerö, 
The new modus operandi gives deniability for actors in combination with 
strategic benefits such as obtaining political goals. The possibility to deny 
any involvement could be a tempting driver for an aggressor. The 
implication is that the IW weapon will be used more in future conflicts both 
as a stand-alone method and in conjunction with military operations.77 
Also, it should be mentioned that compared to previous experiences in Chechnya, 
Russia acted significantly savvier in 2008 in dealing with the media.78 The Kremlin 
appeared to have taken into account the way how the U.S. used to hold briefings during the 
Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns and tried to mimic them. The Russians had a narrative 
prepared and tried to effectively spread it during the initial period of war. It should be 
emphasized, that the Kremlin had such an enormous desire to cooperate with the Russian 
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media that it flew about fifty media representatives to Tskhinvali (“South Ossetia”) several 
days prior to the invasion. This fact is another clear indication how Russia prepared the 
military operation. 
D. GEORBOT CASE 
The GEORBOT case took place in March 2011. The Georgian Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT) and computer experts discovered that the hackers, 
who allegedly were affiliated with Russian intelligence agencies, had infected between 300 
and 400 computers across six Georgian government agencies.79 This compromised botnet 
was nicknamed “GEORBOT” and it executed a specific task, 
The malicious software was programmed to search for specific keywords—
such as USA, Russia, NATO and CIA—in Microsoft Word documents and 
PDFs, and was eventually modified to record audio and take screenshots. 
The documents were deleted within a few minutes from the drop servers, 
after the hacker had copied the files to his own PC.80 
As a first step the CERT disconnected the command-and-control servers. This made 
hackers aware that they had been discovered, but still they decided to continue and increase 
the stealthiness of the operation.81 However, they failed, and the Georgian CERT managed 
to identify them as a possible Russian intelligence affiliated group. The Georgians decided 
to “hack back” and designed a honeypot for that. As a result, the Russian hackers stole a 
compromised “Georgian-NATO Agreement” file that allowed the Georgians to take 
control over the hacker’s computer, collect information regarding further targets and even 
film a short video of the hacker. Obviously, Georgian CERT did not receive any 
cooperation from Moscow’s law enforcement authorities in order to proceed with this case.  
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Apart from another example of Russia’s cyber espionage, this case addresses the 
problem of attribution. Thomas Rid makes a very interesting observation regarding the 
GEORBOT case, 
The GEORBOT incident is probably the only detailed example of a 
successful case of active attribution on the public domain. But perhaps its 
most unusual feature is the fact that the Georgian government made the 
information public. Most intelligence agencies and their governments are 
highly reluctant to publicize such operations, for that could reveal 
vulnerabilities, tactics, skills, and create potential political blowback. Yet, 
if a small and technologically limited agency like Georgia’s Ministry of 
Justice can pull off an active attribution operation in a legally grey area, 
then the assumption is reasonable that mighty and highly specialized 
intelligence agencies of the world’s most technologically sophisticated 
powers can achieve a much higher degree of attribution.82 
This assumption dates from 2011 to 2013. The next incident, which took place in 
2019 basically echoes what Thomas Rid suggested here. 
E. THE OCTOBER CASE 
On October 28, 2019, the cyberattacks were launched on the websites and servers 
of Georgian governmental agencies and private organizations. As a result, almost fifty 
thousand webpages were defaced and attacked through a distributed denial of service 
(DDoS). For “website defacement” the hackers used an image of the former president of 
Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili, to replace the original content. Presumably, the hacker 
sought to add a political ground to an attack and a had an attempt of a political trolling that 
aimed to cause unrest in Georgian society.83 Meanwhile, some of the fringe Georgian 
media outlets and Russian Sputnik attributed the cyberattack to Saakashvili. It should be 
noted that this time the attack was not very sophisticated, which in fact, is a Russian pattern 
too. The negative psychological effect, which is a growing perception of insecurity and 
obfuscation in public is what the Kremlin predominantly expects to achieve from this type 
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of incidents. To this end, Moscow does not require to invest more and design costly cyber 
operations that can paralyze the critical infrastructure and have more destructive effect.  
On February 20, 2020, as a result of investigation and cooperation with Georgia, 
the United Kingdom and the United States published the statement, which said that the 
cyber actor behind the October attack was the Main Center for Special Technologies, also 
known as  “Unit 74455” of the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate, 
namely, the Russian military intelligence service.84 The UK government once again 
underscored in its statement that this group was responsible for the cyberattack on 
Ukraine’s electricity grid in December 2015 and the NotPetya cyberattack in June 2017. 
The United Kingdom assessed the correctness of its attribution as “almost certain” (95 
percent + probability).85 
It should be mentioned that on October 15, 2020, Department of Justice has 
reinforced the allegations and announced that six officers of the unit were charged in 
connection with destabilizing various computer attacks for “the strategic benefit of 
Russia.”86 The illegal activities among others also included NotPetya and the on Georgian 
networks. 
Prior to the attack, on October 22, 2019, the U.S. House of Representatives 
unanimously passed the Georgia Support Act (H.R.598), once again underscoring U.S. 
support for the independence and sovereignty of Georgia.87 It deals with several topics 
related to Georgia’s general security and cybersecurity theme as well. The cooperation 
section regarding cyber portion stipulates that the United States will do the following, 
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(1) Provide Georgia such support as may be necessary to secure government 
computer networks from malicious cyber intrusions, particularly such 
networks that defend the critical infrastructure; (2)  Provide Georgia support 
in reducing reliance on Russian information and communications 
technology; (3) Assist Georgia to build its capacity, expand cybersecurity 
information sharing, and cooperate on international cyberspace efforts.88 
While scrutinizing the Georgia Support Act, it is difficult not to see connections 
between this initiative, which focused on cybersecurity cooperation, and the October 
cyberattack. Furthermore, this operation had been carried out shortly after Georgia’s 
Defense Minister held a bilateral meeting with NATO Secretary General at NATO 
headquarters in Brussels.89 
F. THE LUGAR LAB CASE 
Apart from cyber intrusions, Russia’s “crown jewel” in the twenty-first century 
political warfare is a dissemination of propaganda and disinformation by employing state-
sponsored media, infamous Internet Research Agency (IRA), and agents of influence. It 
should be mentioned that the IRA is a Kremlin-backed organization, also known as the 
“troll farm,” which is a cornerstone of the modern Russian information warfare. It operates 
thousands of fake twitter and Facebook accounts to run different types influence 
operations. For instance, according to a study conducted by RAND corporation, 
In October 2017, news broke that Russia had exploited Facebook as part of 
its information campaign. The Internet Research Agency created dozens of 
Facebook pages that sought to exploit and expand various social division 
created dozens of Facebook pages that sought to exploit and expand various 
social divisions within the United States that included race, religion, 
political affiliation, and class. These pages used Facebook advertising 
algorithms to target the ads to populations most vulnerable to the intended 
message.90 
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In this light, it is noteworthy that the some of the most vulnerable members of 
Georgian society live within the occupied regions of Georgia that have been targeted by 
the Kremlin’s information warfare. For instance, in 2017, a massive disinformation 
campaign was launched against Central Public Health Reference Laboratory (Lugar Lab, 
named after U.S. senator Richard Lugar). Russian-controlled de facto Tskhinvali (South 
Ossetia) representatives accused the central government of Georgia for outbreaks of 
pandemic diseases of humans and animals in Georgia. 
Later, in October 2018, the misleading narrative had been amplified by Russian 
Maj. Gen. Igor Kirilov, who stated that “it’s highly likely that the U.S. is building up its 
military biological potential under the cover of studying protective means and conducting 
other peaceful research, flouting international agreements.”91 He also claimed that these 
activities might have been the reason to the spread of viral infections in the southern part 
of Russia. According to him, “the near simultaneous deaths of a large number of volunteers 
give reason to believe that the Lugar Center was researching a highly toxic and highly 
lethal chemical or biological agent.”92 
In December 2018, a known Russian-sponsored media source, Sputnik News, 
released an article entitled “Russia Concerned over U.S. Biological Activities in 
Georgia.”93 The article freely drew conclusions without sufficient information and was 
based on an interview with the former Georgian Minister of State Security, Igor Giorgadze 
(affiliated with the Russian secret service), who has been accused of plotting to overthrow 
the Georgian leadership and now resides in Russia. In response to the article, then-Deputy 
Foreign Minister of Russia, Grigory Karasin, stated that “the U.S.-funded Richard Lugar 
Laboratory in Georgia allegedly runs biological weapons tests and expects the U.S. and 
Georgian authorities to provide sufficient clarification on the center’s activities.”94  
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Over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Kremlin has continued assaults 
on the Tbilisi-based Lugar Lab and intensified the spread of disinformation by making 
statements implicitly blaming Georgia and the United States for the severe outbreak of the 
coronavirus in Russia.95 These accusations were “proactively backed by the Russian 
defense and foreign ministries, which released tersely worded statements that Russia would 
not allow the production of biological weapons near its borders.”96 
On September 4, 2020, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia stated that a 
malicious cyberattack had been directed to the computer systems of the Ministry of Health 
and Social Affairs of Georgia and on its subordinate agency, the Public Health Research 
Center, which operates the Lugar Lab, by one of the foreign special services. According to 
their statement, “part of the documentation obtained as a result of illegal entry into the 
system is currently uploaded on a foreign webpage and is available to the public. At the 
same time, these pages are loaded with obviously falsified information, deliberately forged 
documents aimed at intimidating the public and generating distrust.”97 
Russia’s overarching objective is to undermine the West and Georgia 
internationally, to sow distrust between people living in the occupied regions of Georgia 
and people living in the rest of the country. It uses the network of propaganda distributors 
which is broad and interconnected. Such a network might be comprised from non-
governmental organizations, political parties, media outlets, and of course the internet and 
social media platforms. Today, Russia relies significantly on the use of various media 
elements for its agents of influence. This, coupled with its cyber capabilities, represent 
Russia’s primary tool for disrupting Georgia’s Western-leaning attitudes and agenda. Thus, 
the Kremlin will intensify its activities below the threshold of military aggression and 
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amplify its propaganda. More likely, the number of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure 
will grow as well.  
G. CONCLUSION 
The main effect of the “information confrontation” concept well known in Russian 
military circles is to manipulate the perceptions of the target audience and influence  
their behavior. Russia considers the field of information to be a strategically decisive  
and critically important domain of the new type of military conflict, which could be  
used to both to exert control over its own population and also, to acquire influence over 
opposing countries.  
Russia’s holistic approach to information warfare encompasses disinformation, 
propaganda, DDoS attacks and espionage. These components of information warfare 
technique are continuously utilized on a daily basis by the recently established cyber units 
of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Many other Kremlin affiliated groups are also engaged 
in performing “cyberattacks, propaganda-oriented actions and inserting malware in the 
command and control systems of opponents.”98 Russia is becoming more assertive “to 
target critical infrastructure systems and conduct espionage operations even when detected 
and under increased public scrutiny.”99  
Furthermore, it is most likely that Moscow will continue to be opportunistic and 
exploit the existing environment in order to advance its strategic interests as seen during 
the Covid-19 pandemic situation. The global crisis caused by the virus gave impetus for 
Russia to intensify its political warfare agenda. This again reinforces the assumption that 
there are blurred lines between war and peace in the Russian understanding. As witnessed 
with regard the Lugar case, subversive actions in cyberspace will continue to pose critical 
threats to Georgia’s security architecture. In particular, Russia’s hostile operations in  
cyberspace will continue to undermine Georgia’s credibility as a modern European country 
that can be a part of NATO or the European Union. Therefore, the Western partner 
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countries need to focus on collaboration with Georgia in order to develop joint 
informational and diplomatic response measures. For instance, attribution and globally 
coordinated “name and shame” campaigns could limit the effectiveness of Russia’s malign 
information operations, because it would be harder for Russia to deny its actions and would 
also, raise awareness in society with regard to the problem itself. 
Bearing in mind that Georgia is not the only country being affected with misleading 
and hostile narratives, a coordinated international approach should be a basic silver bullet 
for tackling the problem. Therefore, in response to the Russian threat, which is a critical 
threat for the West as well, Georgia needs to seek solutions on the domestic and 
international levels. It is important to create a cyber defense mechanism that can prevent 
the cognitive outcome of destructive cyber operations, in addition to the technical effects 
of computer network attacks. In order to counter Russian threats in cyberspace, Georgia 
should design and enforce an effective platform to counter fake news, disinformation and 
propaganda dissemination.  
For finding a way forward for Georgia, the next chapter will examine how Israel 
and Estonia approach to their national cybersecurity and cyberdefense. Like Georgia, these 
two small states face security threats from much bigger and power neighboring states, 
which try to coerce and intimidate them. However, Israel and Estonia continue to move 
forward in a challenging geopolitical environment. Moreover, they timely noticed what 
opportunities would cyber bring and started to invest in development of cyber capacities in 
order to respond to some of the existing challenges for the national security and also, to 
outweigh their shortcomings. In addition, Georgia has historical ties with both countries 
and has been in close cooperation in terms of developing defensive capabilities, including 
cyber field as well. 
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 CYBERSECURITY AND CYBERDEFENSE IN 
ISRAEL AND ESTONIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Israel and Estonia have aggregated vast experiences in mitigating risks in 
cyberspace and addressing modern cyber challenges. Moreover, in the past few years, they 
have developed a long-term vision of cyber security and cyber defense strategy and have 
excelled in using cyber capabilities to support their national security and conventional 
military operations as well. Therefore, as different countries in the world that strive to 
develop their cyber capabilities in order to meet the challenges related to the information 
age and the cyber era, advanced Israeli and Estonian models can serve as a source of 
learning. Furthermore, Israel and Estonia have been selected for analysis due to their 
special relations with Georgia, including cooperation in military and cyber spheres, which 
primarily focuses on sharing best practices, experiences and lessons learned. 
This chapter examines two case studies of the Israeli and Estonian approaches to 
cybersecurity and cyber defense. Due to an unstable geopolitical environment, both Israel 
and Estonia perceive advanced technologies, science, and cyberspace as avenues to gain a 
qualitative edge over their adversaries. This aspiration stems from a severe reality that is 
created by existential security threats posed by rogue and powerful actors that claim the 
status of regional hegemon. 
Israel faces a wide range of challenges in the Middle East region, which has been 
involved in a never-ending conflict since the end of the World War II. The current unstable 
security environment for Israel is largely caused by the Iran and its network of allies in the 
region. Moreover, Iran seeks to expand its cyber capabilities an also cooperates with 
foreign hacktivists as well, including the Syrian Electronic Army, Shi’a Islamist hacker 
groups, and Lebanese Hizballah.100 In addition, apart from being capable of conducting 
series of destructive cyber-attacks—such as on Saudi ARAMCO, or on Israeli critical 
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infrastructure—Iran has started to utilize information domain to implement “international 
influence campaigns promoting news and stories aligned with Iranian interests.”101 Marie 
Baezner argues, that Iran tries to duplicate Russia’s way of waging information warfare 
and have built a “complex networks of fake websites and social media personas to promote 
anti-Saudi Arabia, anti-Israel, pro-Palestinian stories and news on U.S policies in favor of 
Iran.”102 It is noteworthy that, according to the cybersecurity firm FireEye, a Russian lab 
might be involved in developing a malware used during the Saudi ARAMCO incident.103  
Similar to Georgia, Israel is confronted by a larger power that perceives cyber-
attacks as part of a continuum of asymmetric warfare. Moreover, the strategic, tactical, and 
operational logic behind the Russian and Iran cyber operations appear to be similar. Both 
states collaborate with proxy groups and prefer less sophisticated cyber efforts to coerce, 
gain access to sensitive information (espionage), retaliate or signal resolve. They seek to 
exert influence in cyberspace by amplifying state narrative to obfuscate the target audience 
and attain the informational superiority. On the other hand, Israel still remains a successful 
model of resistance and resilience, and the nation continues to advance its interests and 
build a robust framework of security and defense, and in particular cyber capacity. To this 
reason, examining the Israeli approach with regard to addressing the cyber threats appears 
to be a compelling effort for Georgia, which is in the process of shaping its cyber posture.  
Georgia and Estonia, both as post-Soviet states, are still perceived as a sphere of 
privileged interest by Russia. In addition, Estonia has a significant Russian-speaking 
minority. According to 2011 data, almost 30 percent of Estonia’s citizens are Russian 
speakers, of which 25 percent perceive and identify themselves as Russians. This factor 
gives the Kremlin the leverage to undermine the Baltic state by internally disrupting it. For 
instance, in 2007, “the state’s banking and public administration systems” were attacked 
as a result of the DDoS attack, “following a dispute with Russia over the movement of a 
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Soviet-era statue.”104 As Heickero notes, this incident has been “a wake-up call to 
highlight the risks, threats and vulnerabilities on information warfare. The operation 
directed against Estonia was one of the first official and publicly known cyber-attacks 
against a country using large-scale botnets and DDoS by nationalist-driven civilians.”105   
Despite the fact that Estonia is a member of NATOs alliance, Russia still poses a 
significant threat to the national security of the small Baltic state. Moreover, between 2014 
and 2015, the RAND Corporation assessed the probable outcome of a Russian invasion of 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, concluding that the time required for “Russian forces to 
reach the outskirts of the Estonian and/or Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga, respectively, 
is 60 hours.”106 Russia seeks to exploit the existing weak spots use them at their advantage. 
Therefore, it resorts to “strategic information operations and propaganda activities that are 
part of campaigns designed to undermine trust in their institutions, foment ethnic and social 
tensions, and erode confidence in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) collective 
defense commitments.”107  
B. EVOLUTION OF MODERN ISRAELI CYBERSECURITY 
Israel has constantly faced existential threats from state and non-state actors since 
its foundation. Yet the country has been coping with this complex geopolitical situation, 
and today, it has a reputation as a democratic state with a highly technological army. The 
responsibility for implementing and conducting Israel’s cybersecurity and defense cyber 
strategy is assigned to two organizations: The Israeli National Cyber Directorate (INCD) 
and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Despite the fact that the strategy has not been 
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published as a unified document, some aspects and approaches are given in different 
national regulations and activities.108  
The first key event in the evolutionary ladder of Israel’s national cyber security and 
defense policy was the establishment of a special regulatory body: The National 
Information Security Agency (NISA). Since its founding in 2003, NISA has worked to 
ensure the safety of critical infrastructure and was mandated to coordinate and supervise 
the implementation of governmental instructions. 
The next milestone was the launch of the National Cyber Initiative, which in 2010 
incentivized the first cyber-strategy design and facilitated the adoption of the Government 
Resolution 3611 “Promoting national capacity in cyberspace.” The document noted, 
To work towards advancing national capabilities in cyberspace and 
improving management of current and future challenges in cyberspace. To 
improve the defense of national infrastructures essential for maintaining a 
stable and productive life in the State of Israel, and to strengthen those 
infrastructures, as much as possible, against cyberattack by advancing 
Israel’s status as a center for the development of information technologies 
while encouraging cooperation among academia, industry, and the private 
sector, government ministries and special bodies.109  
This initiative resulted in two main outcomes: first, foundation of the Israeli 
National Cyber Bureau (INCB), which was established in 2012 and mandated to lead and 
coordinate national cyber policy across the public and private sectors; and second, the 
promotion of research and development (R&D) in cyberspace.110 In fact, it became the 
main advising body for the government in both crafting and implementation of national 
policy in the cyber field. 
In 2015, a new operational agency—the National Cyber Security Authority 
(NCSA)—was established by the Israeli government to cooperate with INCB and ensure 
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the security of Israeli civilian cyberspace. Having no law-enforcement power, its main 
functions included guidance of the private sector and information sharing, also, acting as a 
regulator, and assistance in case of cyberattacks. It is noteworthy that this model was 
designed to focus on cooperation, develop technology, and increase societal trust as well. 
In addition, NCSA has incorporated the critical infrastructure protection organization—
NISA, and also, has founded the National Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-
IL). According to Tabansky, it is a “central public contact point for support for all civilian 
non-critical sectors” and “the central pillar in the long-term effort to secure Israel’s civilian 
sector at large.”111 
Later, in 2017, INCB and NCSA together formed the INCD in the Prime Minister’s 
office, which was tasked with coordinating the cyber policy and building the cyber force 
of Israel. As a result, the defensive component of Israel’s cybersecurity was transformed 
into a more centralized institution with a simpler hierarchy. It should be mentioned that the 
INCD partners with the Israel Innovation Authority and has initiated the establishment of 
Cyber Research Centers in Israeli universities and different innovation programs.112  
C. CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY OF ISRAEL 
The first National Cyber Security Strategy of Israel became known to public in 
2017. According to the document, Israel views cyberspace “as an engine of economic 
growth, social welfare and national security.”113 In the same year, Israel also adopted the 
Digital Israel Initiative, which seeks to benefit from information and communication 
technologies as a means to boost the economy, and a create smart government 
administration.114 In other words, the goal is to transform Israeli society into a digital and 
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innovative society that is governed by an electronic government (e-government). However, 
this new initiative, which implies the use of information and communication technologies 
for various interactions, automatically poses additional challenges for Israeli national 
security and for its cyber security in particular. Therefore, securing cyberspace is one of 
the main national interests of Israel and obviously, cyber security strategy serves as a 
practical foundation for it.  
Today, Israel’s cyber security strategy is “designed to efficiently structure the 
national efforts and to ensure a stable, long-term solution.”115 According to Jasper Frei, 
this document “includes both direct state actions to confront cyber risks as well as indirect 
efforts, which aim at supporting and collaborating with the private sector.”116 It establishes 
new  holistic concepts and is based on the three-layer approach: Aggregate Cyber 
Robustness, Systemic Cyber Resilience and National Cyber Defense. Cyber Robustness 
aims to prevent high-level damage through the promotion of best practices, regulations, 
and incentives. Also, it sets high cyber security requirements for government institutions 
as an exemplar for private companies.117 Conversely, Systemic Cyber Resilience focuses 
on confronting a cyberattack when it happens and minimizing the damage for the nation. 
As mentioned above, the CERT-IL, which is under the National Cyber Directorate, works 
actively with the private sector to develop Systemic Cyber Resilience by encouraging 
information sharing and offering assistance during cyber incidents.118 For instance, this 
second layer is activated in the event of incidents that “do not present an immediate threat, 
but may cause cumulative damage over time, or might and severe a national defense 
response as the understanding of the threat evolves.”119 
The third layer addresses the most critical national security threats that are posed 
by the resource-rich attackers and are emanated from cyberspace. As Frei notes, the third 
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layer “relies on the two preceding layers and includes not only defensive measures bust 
also active cyberdefense and offensive actions by national security and law enforcement 
organs to counter both state and non-state aggression to achieve deterrence.”120 
D. THE IDF AND NATIONAL CYBERDEFENSE STRATEGY 
In 2015, Israel started to regard cyberspace as a fifth domain of warfare.121 Today, 
the most fundamental body in the implementation process of cyber strategy is the Israel 
Defense Forces, which is a central organization and perceived as a symbol of strength of 
the state. Apart from prime defensive functions, it is also engaged in science and in the 
research and development process of different spheres, such as education, high-tech 
industry and cybersecurity. The IDF sees cyber as a an important qualitative force 
multiplier and follows the logic of Israeli grand strategy that posits the importance of “the 
quest for qualitative superiority to balance numerical inferiority.”122 For this reason, it has 
been largely interested in the development of advanced technologies used in electronic 
warfare, information warfare, encryption and signal intelligence.123 As Major-General 
Amidror notes, 
IDF, like other militaries, is pre-occupied with working out how best to 
integrate cyber capabilities, for both defensive and offensive purposes. 
Since it is clear that cyber warfare will become hugely important in the 
coming years, and because there is a long road ahead, the IDF is already 
investing considerable sums of money and highly talented personnel in this 
area and is engaged in the deep and broad development of its cyber 
capabilities.124  
Obviously, Israel’s major national security concerns are not related to the cyber 
domain; there are more existential challenges. However, in April 2020, a cyberattack 
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allegedly conducted by Iran targeted different water and sewage treatment facilities across 
Israel.125 On May 9, a cyberattack on the system that controls Iran’s Shahid Rajaee port 
brought the system to an abrupt and inexplicable halt.126 The IDF Chief of Staff Aviv 
Kochavi did not confirm his government’s involvement, but he did comment that Israel 
would continue to act with a mix of instruments. Israel allegedly went for “hack back” and 
signaled its resolve by retaliating.127 This type of incidents and the changing nature of 
waging war propelled the IDF to start focusing on corresponding warfare capabilities to 
start addressing the threats. According to Gil Baram,  
The cyber technology used in warfare affects the way the latter is conducted. 
… Cyber warfare technologies have the potential for enormous advantages 
along with new and unfamiliar risks. Given the sweeping innovation in this 
field, the understanding of its nature and consequences has only begun.128  
The IDF also actively started to participate in drills and capacity building in order 
to secure the state in emergencies. These drills were conducted in close cooperation with 
the National Cyber Directorate because it plays an integral part in “defending and 
protecting the national cyberspace in emergencies and wartime.”129 
In 2017, the C4I (command, control, computers, communications, and intelligence) 
and Cyber Defense branch was unified as a branch and established within the IDF as a 
central entity for Israel’s cyberdefense. The given mandate is to secure the IDF’s 
communication systems and network. Also, it holds responsibility for supporting the IDF 
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by training its Information and Communications Technology (ICT) professions, advancing 
system architecture, developing cryptographic foundations and software.130 
Unit 8200 is a subordinate to the Military Intelligence Directorate, which itself 
operates under the IDF, but is “an independent service that is not part of the ground forces, 
the Navy, or the Air Force.”131 Unit 8200 serves primarily as a signal intelligence collector 
and code decryption unit. According to Sean Cordey, it is was involved with such offensive 
and defensive cyber operations such as: Operation Orchard (2007), Stuxnet (2010), 
Operation Full Disclosure (2014) and the Ogero Incident (2017).132 Unit 8200 also is 
mandated to perform “Computer Network Attack (CNA) and Computer Network 
Exploitation (CNE).”133 In addition, this branch is considered by many as “an incubator 
for future very successful cybersecurity startups, technology venture capitalists, and 
cybersecurity experts.”134 This fact is primarily conditioned by the Israeli compulsory 
conscription system, which integrates Israeli citizens into its cyber security agencies.135 
As a result, “conscripts absorb the military capital, or part of it, while in service and 
“export” it into the civilian sphere where it converts well, especially in the hi-tech 
sector.”136 In fact, military background in Israeli technological field is considered as an 
advantage and often equals to a University degree.137   
 
130 Tabansky, “Israel Defense Forces and National Cyber Defense,” 56. 
131 Tabansky, 56. 
132 Sean Cordey, The Israeli Unit 8200: An OSINT-Based Study (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 
2020), 9, https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html/2beaf2b8-3d47-4be9-
8553-18e7a8ce7c8e. 
133 Tabansky, 56. 
134 Cordey, The Israeli Unit 8200, 3. 
135 Jamie Collier, “Cyber Reserves Are Not a Silver Bullet,” War on the Rocks, May 22, 2020. 
https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/cyber-reserves-are-not-a-silver-bullet/ 
136 Tabansky, 58. 
137 Ori Swed and john Sibley Butler, “Military Capital in the Israeli Hi-Tech Industry,” Armed Forces 
& Society 41, no. 1(August 2013): 131.  
44 
It should be noted that Israel had planned to establish a central cyber command, but 
later decided to keep its defensive and offensive military capacities manner.138 According 
to Lior Tabansky, enhanced national cybersecurity can be based on the following general 
strategies: 1. In order to provide additional cybersecurity, the military should be permitted 
to operate within domestic civilian cyberspace, and 2. Conventional defense forces should 
be reduced and new civilian organizations established for cybersecurity. He further notes, 
that bearing in mind the success of Israel in civilian cybersecurity, eventually more 
novelties are to be foreseen.139 
The IDF has focused on upgrading its capabilities in the cybersphere. For instance, 
about 10 billion New Israeli Shekel (NIS) were invested in the Digital Ground Army 
project, which aim to provide “better functionality and optimization in concentrating 
information about the enemy, the IDF, and the combined use of IDF force.”140 Moreover, 
overarching changes and reorganizations entailed inter-governmental cooperation among 
the IDF and other state agencies like Mossad or General Security Service.  
The Israeli focus on building cyber capacities represents a holistic responsive 
mechanism to modern cyber threats. This comprehensive approach is largely premised by 
the Israeli total defense model, which itself is a common feature for a small state.  
E. THE ESTONIAN CYBERSECURITY AND STRATEGY 
Estonia is visited by thousands of delegations each year to learn about its existing 
digital ecosystem.141 For instance, 46.7 percent of Estonians used internet for voting 
during the European Parliament Elections.142 Major government services have been 
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digitalized, like legislation, education, justice, health care, taxes, etc.143 Moreover, in 
2017, Estonia pioneered the world’s first “Data Embassy” in Luxembourg.144 Contrary to 
a traditional embassy, this data center is a cloud server that backs up Estonian e-governance 
networks. 
In 2007, Estonia became the first country to face different forms of DDoS attacks 
that lasted for three weeks and had a politically motivated ground.145 This incident served 
as a lesson for Estonia, despite the fact that Russia never acknowledged the attack. It 
created a solid basis for further Estonian development and today, Estonia is the first country 
in the world to have adopted a third cyber security strategy. The new Cybersecurity 
Strategy 2019–2022 once again highlights Estonia’s long-time vision, objectives, and 
priority areas in the cyber domain. Objectively, Estonia is regarded as the most resilient 
digital society; it has absolute trust in digital public services and can cope with evolving 
cyber threats with great success due to the vision and principles it has embraced. 
Interestingly, Estonia does not differentiate between cyber and physical domains in 
terms of protecting and promoting fundamental rights and freedoms. Moreover, it views 
digital development as a basis for socioeconomic growth and focuses on establishing an 
Estonian digital ecosystem. For this reason, special attention is drawn to the role of 
innovation in security, cryptography, and the overarching principle of open 
communication.146 
The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications is the leading body in the 
area of cyber security. However, the Ministry of Defense is in charge of organizing national 
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cyber defense, in cooperation with the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, Estonian 
Defense Forces Cyber Command, and Cyber Defense Unit.147  
According to the National Defense Strategy of Estonia, “the Estonian Defense 
League is a voluntary, militarily organized, armed, national defense organization” which 
is under the Ministry of Defense and mandated to develop a cyberdefense capability.148 
The first cyber defense units were formed in 2009, after the notorious 2007 cyberattacks 
against Estonia. On January 28, 2011, the Cyber Defense Unit (CDU) was officially 
established within the Estonian Defense League.149 The mission of the CDU is to protect 
Estonian cyberspace, including protection of information infrastructure and support of 
national defense objectives.  
The CDU is formed from individuals who have different backgrounds and want to 
contribute to cyber security. CDU objectives include several interesting and important 
tasks. For instance, such as the development of cooperation among qualified IT specialists, 
the creation of public-private partnership network, participation in international cyber 
security training events. 
Estonia plays a key role in developing NATO’s cyber defense policy. In August 
2018, the Estonian Cyber Command was formed on the basis of the Headquarters Support 
and Signal Battalion and the Joint Headquarters. The major missions include defending the 
country’s information systems, assisting NATO allies, and preparing for active cyber 
defense operations.150  
The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence is based in Tallinn. 
Its mission is to enhance capability, cooperation and information-sharing between NATO 
member states in cyber defense. Moreover, Estonia cooperates with NATO allies and 
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partners in cyber field as well. Its primary objective is to achieve outstanding competence 
in conducting large-scale cyber exercises on the technical as well as strategic level. More 
than 1,500 cyber experts from 30 nations took part in 2019’s Locked Shields exercise. 
Another exercise, Crossed Swords, focused on developing the tactical responsive cyber 
defense skills of cyber experts.151  
The latest Estonian Cybersecurity Strategy 2019–2022 envisages four objectives 
along with coexisting challenges and the ways to attainment. The first objective is to 
address challenges posed by insufficient institutional awareness of information systems 
security and misperceptions about cyber threats in general in order to build a sustainable 
digital society. For this reason, the cybersecurity strategy aims to preserve a sustainable 
digital society by developing technological resilience and working towards cyber incident-
related crisis prevention, preparedness, and resolution.152 
The second objective is to support Estonian cybersecurity Research and 
Development (R&D), and by 2022, form a strong, innovative and globally competitive 
industry. The main obstacles in overcoming this are limitations in investments and the lack 
of Estonian cybersecurity companies in international markets.153 
As a third strategic objective, Estonia aspires to become a top international 
contributor with a visible footprint, and to become a partner on cyber issues with the 
European Union, NATO and the United Nations. The strategy envisages regular joint 
exercises and information sharing within the bilateral cooperation framework.154 
The last objective stipulated in the document is defined as the Estonian goal to build 
a cyber-literate society, which entails high cybersecurity awareness among its citizens, 
state and private sector. Estonia realized that it lacked a cyber savvy workforce and has 
sought to develop sufficient forward-looking human talent. Its goals are to strengthen and 
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improve the skills of its mid-level officials through particular cyber defense courses and to 
facilitate the development of talent according to state and private demand.155 
F. CONCLUSION 
Cybersecurity remains a challenging component of broad national security and 
defense. Gradually, some nations have started to pursue steps similar to those taken by 
Estonia and Israel, focusing on digital governmental services or emerging technologies. 
Many countries have yet to develop an overarching cybersecurity strategy and to ensure 
the security of their critical infrastructure and citizens by cooperating with the private 
sector and the international community. The Estonian and Israeli cases demonstrate both 
the opportunity of the cyberspace and the threats that are related to unsecured networks 
and systems. They understood that investing in science, technological development, and 
human capital would result in a more secure cyberspace.  
The Estonian and Israeli cases demonstrate both the potential severity of digital 
threats, and responses that states may take to safeguard against future cyberattacks. A 
cyber-crisis management plan at a national level is a very important element in a national 
cybersecurity strategy, as it focuses on the national coordination and mitigation efforts 
during the crisis. Many cyber-incidents occur on a daily basis and are mitigated promptly 
at an operational level, without necessarily leading to a crisis situation. Cyber-crisis 
specific procedures should explain the steps and actions that are needed during the cyber-
crisis. Few countries have pursued similar steps in the direction of securing cyberspace like 
Estonia and Israel. Many countries have yet to develop an organization-wide cybersecurity 
strategy and start engaging in cooperation and information sharing globally. The use of an 
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 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the post-Soviet period, Russia continued the Soviet tradition of active measures 
in foreign and security policy, subverting the perceived adversaries, and extended these 
measures to the cyber domain. This, for Russia, was a cost-effective way of increasing its 
influence, especially in the so-called “near abroad” and coercing weaker powers into 
submission, exhausting their morale and the will to resist.  
Russian defense and security doctrines consider cyberspace as part of the 
information space and view cyber operations as a unified concept, integral to its defense 
and security policy. These views are best expressed in the so-called Gerasimov doctrine, 
which has become a shorthand for Russia’s active measures both in case of stand-alone 
cyber-attacks as well as when serving as accompanying part of larger, more complex 
military operations. The purpose of these operations is the reflexive control of perceived 
adversaries, winning their populations’ “hearts and minds,” and, in case of failure, pursuing 
the tactics of coercion and intimidation. Cyber disruption, spying, and the manipulation of 
the perceptions of the target audiences have been the major objectives of Russian 
information operations as evident in the cases with Georgia, Estonia, and Ukraine at 
different times in the last decade and half.  
For cyber operations, Russia uses proxy groups, which can be deployed both in 
longer-term, continuous manner as well as for immediate cyber-disruption in a relatively 
short-term period during special and/or military ground operations. These are coupled with 
the means of psychological warfare in a form of “informational confrontation,” which is 
normally the initial phase of the conflict aimed at degrading the adversary’s capacity for 
resistance.  
However, the historical record shows that Russia’s active measures have certain 
limits. Frequently, they are isolated acts of cyber-disruption with no significant political 
consequences. Also, in cases when they are employed in conjunction with propagandistic 
measures, these acts of informational warfare are not necessarily fatal and may be 
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effectively countered by the opponent’s consistent and coordinated efforts – both 
technologically and politically.  
Russia’s experience with the armed conflict with Georgia shows that in case of 
short-term military campaign of August 2008, Russia employed its cyber-warfare 
capabilities as a corollary to its extensive ground military operation. These cyber-measures 
aimed at hindering the Georgian Government’s efforts to resist and retaliate the adversary’s 
superior ground and naval forces. The major achievement of Russian cyber-operations 
during the war was psychological, having demonstrated Moscow’s ability to disrupt 
Georgian Government’s communication channels with its own population. However, for 
Russian armed forces, these cyber-measures did not bring about any qualitative advantage 
over Georgia.  
The following two cases of Russian intrusion into Georgia’s cyber-space were less 
effective, in terms of political objectives, as they represented isolated cases of hacking of 
computer networks of several agencies of the Georgian Government. And finally, in the 
case of the Lugar Lab, Russia attempted to use propaganda and disinformation to discredit 
the work of US-backed Central Public Health Reference Laboratory, but also, later in 2020, 
targeting the Lab’s computer system so that to discredit its work in the eyes of the domestic 
and international public.  
As Russia continues to pose critical threat to Georgia’s defense and security 
infrastructure, it is of paramount importance to share and adopt the experiences of countries 
with similar infrastructural and political structures, including the power asymmetries with 
the opponents. Two such cases are Israel and Estonia. These small countries managed to 
create effective long-term cyber defense and cybersecurity systems, capable of fending off 
potential cyber-attacks from disproportionately superior powers.  
The key elements of such effective systems that enable the smaller countries, 
specifically, Georgia, to counter the superior adversaries’ information measures, both 
political and cyber-generated, include the following: 
First, it is important to develop a long-term vision of cyber security and cyber 
defense strategy, using cyber capabilities to support both day-to-day security infrastructure 
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as well as military operations. Such documents help to develop coordination between 
various branches of authority, as well as between the center and the regions, when it comes 
to resisting a superior invading power. Secure communication infrastructure may become 
key in such cases. Coordination between the armed forces and police, as well as between 
the central government and local administrations, and strategic communication with own 
population may be key in ensuring avoidance of panic (causing various shortages in fuel 
and food as well as fleeing from the epicenter of the conflict toward the border areas) and 
other forms of civil disruption, which were widespread during the August 2008 war.  
Second, a separate, yet integrated cybersecurity unit should be established and 
maintained in the highest civilian office of the country, the one directly responsible for the 
coordination of national cybersecurity strategy and operations. Normally, this is 
Presidential or Prime-Ministerial administration. In a hypothetical scenario, such an office 
would coordinate secure communication between various ministries and agencies, in case 
if normal communication channels have been disrupted. Such a generic system is being 
implemented in Georgia, known as Business Continuity Management system, under the 
auspices of the European Union and United Nations Development Programme. The system 
is implemented in various key state institutions and, yet, the system may require a separate 
and consolidated administrative unit, which would ensure its smooth nation-wide 
functioning in extraordinary circumstances.  
Third, an appropriate national security strategy plan, as a single document, should 
be created and widely acknowledged as such a document helps to coordinate the work of 
all relevant bodies responsible for not only cyber but also conventional security activities 
throughout the nation. Such documents raise awareness about the potential dangers of 
information warfare both in technological as well as political terms. Also, such documents 
may help to endow Government’s actions with more legitimacy in critical times, as 
political opposition in today’s polarized world may deem the Government’s actions 
arbitrary and self-serving. In the follow-up of the August 2008 war, after a brief hiatus, 
Georgian opposition staged large-scale demonstrations with demands to oust the 
Government, and the Government found itself in difficult situation as it had no legitimate 
52 
reference for explaining some of its security and diplomatic actions during and after the 
war to the population.  
Fourth, strategic communications are of utmost importance for preparing the 
Government, armed forces, and general population for potential propagandistic attack, 
“soft power” offensive, coercion and intimidation by the adversary. Attacks against the 
morale of the population are usually the preparatory stage of a larger-scale military 
operations as well as active measures. Strategic communication blueprint is needed to 
counter hostile propaganda not only nationally (to prevent panic and further civilian 
disturbance) but also for waging international information warfare for garnering external 
political support. In the immediate follow-up of the August 2008 military campaign, 
Georgian diplomatic service found itself in difficult circumstances as it faced 
overwhelming worldwide disinformation coming from Russian official and unofficial 
sources, accusing Georgian Government of starting hostile actions and committing mass 
atrocities. There was little awareness or plan of what can be done in a systematic way to 
counter hostile propaganda in electronic mass media. This warrants development of a 
consistent blueprint for strategic communications action plan for averting such disruption 
in future. 
Fifth, with the increased digitalization of Georgia, the cybersecurity threats will 
only gain in importance, elevating information warfare issues in the hierarchy of national 
security priorities. Therefore, addressing these pressing issues should be one of the major 
concerns of national security establishment of Georgia. As evidenced from the substantive 
chapters of this thesis, in 2008, Georgia was relatively spared of cyber disruption, due to 
the latter’s underdevelopment. This is not the case anymore. With the nation-wide 
digitization, Georgia’s governance and economy is becoming fast dependent on its digital 
infrastructure. Therefore, the management of its cybersecurity should be developing in 
anticipation of progress, not following it. Therefore, cybersecurity matters should be 
introduced in every sphere of public management and constitute one of the core areas of 
Georgia’s civilian defense component of its “total defense” philosophy, which is currently 
under development.  
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Sixth, internationalization of efforts against foreign cyber-attacks is of paramount 
importance, as cyber-attacks and other active measures are, normally, accompanying larger 
and more serious political campaigns that target the country’s resilience and military 
readiness. Therefore, domestic strategic communications should be complemented with 
international measures, through diplomatic and security channels with the leading strategic 
international partners, i.e., the United States, NATO countries, including, especially, the 
leading European nations, and Turkey. Georgia enjoys special strategic relations with 
NATO, framed in the Alliance’s enhanced opportunities initiative. Since 2014, Georgia 
has had NATO’s Substantive Cooperation Package, which was only recently updated and 
strengthened at the 1–2 December NATO Foreign Ministerial. The new additions to the 
Substantive Package include secure communications and cybersecurity elements. This 
indicates that the NATO-Georgia cooperation is rather well-established and coordinated in 
the information warfare domain. And this direction seems to be gaining more and more 
dynamic speed in mutual relationship. Given that Russia seems to more sensitive and 
apprehensive to international response to its actions, especially when it comes to sanctions, 
than to Georgia’s (or, for that matter, Ukraine’s) military capabilities, Georgia’s effective 
coordination with international community may be a more potent (and certainly cost-
effective) deterrent against Russia than the development of defense infrastructure and 
hardware. The point is that in some great and medium powers, especially in Europe, 
acuteness of Russian threat to European security is still disputed politically. Therefore, for 
effective international deterrent, Georgia needs more and more enhanced coordination at 
the international level to achieve meaningful political effectiveness for developing a 
persuasive political deterrent against the adversary.  
Seventh, Georgia should invest more in Research and Development as cyber 
warfare and information domain cannot be meaningfully separated from the rest of 
infrastructure or body politic. Holistic development of these domains is key to successful 
defense of the nation. This offers yet another chance of cooperation with NATO. Since 
Georgian Government committed to the upgrade of its education and research capacities 
by increasing the general budget for education and science several-fold, the, Research and 
Development in cybersecurity can be listed as one of the priorities, especially given that 
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innovation is the common theme in Georgian Government’s economic program for the 
next four years. Coupled with the popularity of state-sponsored start-ups, innovative 
research in cybersecurity field may be one of the leading directions in Georgia’s defense 
infrastructure.  
Eighth, given that cyber domain is often privately driven, Georgian Government 
should pay greater attention to the coordination between public institutions and private 
entities in ensuring that there is enough capacity for waging information campaigns both 
in technological as well as political terms. Technological resource can be found and 
integrated throughout the country, among the cutting-edge innovative private enterprises 
and start-ups that have been supported by Georgian Government in the last few years.  
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